


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
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
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THE



MONROE DOCTRINE.

BY JOSHUA LEAVITT.



New-York:

SINCLAIR TOUSEY—121 NASSAU STREET.

GENERAL AGENT FOR NEWSDEALERS AND BOOKSELLERS.

1851.





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THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

THE old platform of religious exclusives—“*Resolvent*, 1st, that the earth belongs to the saints; and—*Resolvent*, 2dly, that we are the saints”—was not original with the fanatics to whom it has been imputed. It is, in fact, but a summary of the code of public law which prevailed in Europe at the period when America was discovered. The nations calling themselves Christian assumed the right of seizing and occupying all lands inhabited by barbarians, and in case of a dispute as to boundaries or priority of claim, the Pope was recognized as the supreme judge and divider among them, from whose decrees there was no appeal but to the ultimate arbitrament of arms. A comparison of this simple code with that complicated system of rules by which the intercourse of nations is now regulated, would show the advances which civilization has made in this respect since the Reformation. In modern public law, some apology for the seizure of territories, occupied by barbarians, is deemed necessary, beyond the grants of the Pope, or the natural rights of Christians to the ownership of the whole earth. There were certain rules by which European nations agreed to divide the American continent among themselves, and these are still referred to among diplomatists in discussing questions of boundary and the like. But the validity of the original title is no longer allowed to be drawn into discussion. It is sufficient to say that all America is held under titles derived from the governments of Europe. And all questions of title, except as modified by local law, are decided according to the rules and principles of the European country to whose original sovereignty all rights of individual ownership refer. It is impossible, therefore, to suppress this fact, in any faithful investigation of our relations to Europe.

But in addition to this, we must remember that every civilized community on this continent was originally constituted by

the authority of some European monarch, and for about two centuries was governed by the laws, and disposed of by the will of the mother country. They were mere dependent colonies, having no rights except by the gift of their sovereigns, and, indeed, were held to be owned as the rightful property of those sovereigns, and liable as property to be assigned by one to another, or captured in war from one by another, at will, like any other absolute possession. They were simple appendages of the political system of Europe, liable at any time, without any will or agency of their own, to be involved in the calamities and responsibilities of war, for objects in which they had no interest, and then to have the war ended by treaty in which their welfare received no consideration. Without having any voice in the matter, they could be transferred to new masters, or used in any other way as mere counters in the settlement of dynastic quarrels, or make-weights in the re-adjustment of the European "Balance of Power."

The Declaration of Independence was the first breath of independent national life on this continent. The United States assumed at once the rank and the responsibilities of a real nation among nations, having the right to govern itself, to make war and peace, and to determine its own policy in relation to other nations, according to its own judgment of its own interests and duties. This new nation was not in Europe, was not subject to the liabilities of the European governments, not interested in the rise and fall of European dynasties, not concerned for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, not subject to the calculations and complications of European statesmanship. It was a new sensation, an unsolved problem, to meet face to face an American nation, civilized, Christian, responsible, and respectable, demanding a place among the family of nations, as one of them, and yet separate and aloof from all the machinations of diplomacy, and unconcerned in any of the anxieties of state-craft. No wonder that kings and courts were at a loss and uneasy with such an anomaly. From that day no art or effort has been left untried to bring the United States into their circle, as a new subject for their tricks and manœuvres.

The philosophical student of history, who looks deeply into

the springs and currents of national sympathy and antipathy, will be struck with admiration at the completeness of our separation from European politics, so that no friendships ensnared us, no professions seduced us, no fears intimidated us, to swerve from our isolated position. From a century of dependence, we rose by a leap to independence. We had a war with France and a war with England, to prove that we were independent, and to show that we dared and were able to assert and enjoy our rights, as an independent power, unconnected with the political fortunes of European nations. And we began to be understood in Europe. The result was well stated by Mr. Richard Rush, who was our Minister to England from 1817 to 1825. In the second series of his "Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London," he says:

"Let me here give brief expression to a feeling I often had during my mission; one which is common, I suppose, to every minister of the United States abroad. It is, his feeling of entire independence of the combinations and movements going on among other powers. Properly improved, this makes his personal situation agreeable, as well with the court where he may be residing, as with the entire diplomatic corps. For his country, he has only to be just and fear not. The smaller Powers cannot have this calm assurance; and the representatives of the Great Powers naturally respect the office of American Minister, from a knowledge of the resources and growing power of the nation that sends him; and also (some of them) from dreaming of contingencies which may make the friendship of the United States desirable, though their maxim be, 'Peace and commerce with all nations, entangling alliance with none.' One of the members of the corps who witnessed the salutations passing between Lord Castlereagh and myself, said to me a few minutes afterwards, 'How happy you must feel in those times when none of us know what is to happen in Europe!—you belong to us (meaning the corps), yet you are independent.'" pp. 357-8.

Such was the practical estimate formed by diplomatists of the actual situation of the United States among the nations of Europe, as observed by one of the most calm and cautious of our statesmen, with ample experience. We were among them, but not of them; concerned in all that concerned them, on the ground of common humanity and equal civilization; liable to be affected in our interests by all their movements, which we were therefore obliged to comprehend and to watch; but not forming a part of their "system," to be dictated to by their will, to be assigned our place by their arbitrament, or to be disposed of in accordance with their varying interests or arbitrary caprices. We can ap-

preciate the air of satisfaction, not to say pride, with which this experience was recorded and published. It was gratifying to the highest feelings of patriotism. To realize the importance of the facts thus elicited, it is necessary to consider briefly the nature of the European Political System, of which our able representative was so glad that we were not a member.

The Political System of Europe, as it existed at the time of Mr. Rush's residence in England, was the result of the political history of Europe for three centuries, beginning with the reign of Charles the Fifth, and ending with the Congress of Vienna. It was the product of its wars, treaties, dynastic changes, and advancing intelligence and civilization. In all these changes, one dominant idea has been kept always in view by European statesmen, as more important than any family interests or any changes of dynasty or form of government. This paramount object of regard, this central point of guidance, this first meridian of all political reckonings, is oftenest designated by the name of the "Balance of Power." Personal ambitions and family interests, war and peace, have been made subordinate to this. The most elaborate treatises on public affairs have had for their object the elucidation of this subject, in its various bearings and consequences. To understand this subject, in its infinite complications and implications, and to be able to steer among them all a successful course of administration of affairs, made a man a statesman. Of this whole complex system of relations, obligations, and liabilities, the Balance of Power was so much the central principle, that the phrase is customarily used by writers to denote the whole Political System, including all other elements as subordinate.

Vattel's definition of a Balance of Power—"Such a disposition of things as that no one potentate or state shall be able absolutely to predominate and prescribe to others"—expresses rather the ostensible and praiseworthy object which ought to be aimed at, than the secret motives by which governments are commonly actuated, or the results actually attained by this great political system. The circle of nations who recognize this system are supposed to maintain an understanding among themselves, that no one among them can interfere with the essential rights of an-

other among them, without exposing itself to the censure of the rest, and then to the danger of a counter interference and coalition for the redress of the wrong. Also, that no one nation ought to acquire such surpassing power as to be able to defy this censure, or to domineer at pleasure over any or all of the rest. The conditions to curb the grasping ambition of Charles the Fifth, of Louis the Fourteenth, and of Napoleon Bonaparte, are instances of gigantic struggle and vast combination of strength for the preservation of the Balance of Power. The occasions, methods, and limitations, of this system have become a complex science, taxing the powers of the profoundest scholars. Its application to the ever varying exigencies created by the ambition of kings, the profligacy of their ministers, and the constantly shifting conditions of nations, has taxed to the utmost the sagacity of the wisest statesmen. It is a problem in history, which we shall not now attempt to solve, whether this theory of the Balance of Power, or the entire Political System of which it commonly stands as the exponent, has been a blessing to mankind or a curse; whether it has prevented more wars than it has caused, or has mitigated rather than aggravated the severities of war; whether it has improved or injured the cause of liberty, and advanced or retarded the progress of civilization. There are not wanting able and weighty opinions on either side of the question.

After the overthrow of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna assumed the restoration of this great political system, and placed its control and conservation under the care of the Five Great Powers, as they were termed—Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, as a sort of Executive Committee, whose united determinations were to bind all the rest. The British Government, indeed, on technical grounds and for domestic reasons, declined to become in form a party to the so-called Holy Alliance. But it participated fully in all the negotiations, and approved all the arrangements then made, and has at all times maintained and relied upon the adjustments then agreed upon. Its recent letter of remonstrance on behalf of Poland, is based upon the obligations of the treaty of Vienna. The practical administration of the machinery so artistically arranged at Vienna, it must be confessed, has partaken quite largely of the ordinary

irregularities of human institutions. A man setting himself down to study that arrangement and anticipate its results in forty years' operation, would hardly bring out the actual state of things now existing in Europe. How it works in practice, we may learn, at least in part, from an eminent living writer, whose work is just now exciting great attention in the highest circles of Europe.

Mr. Kinglake devotes the second chapter of his *History of the Crimean Campaign* to a delineation of the Public Law, of Europe, which he terms the Supreme Usage, and which he treats from the English point of view, in a very original as well as *very English* manner. The opening paragraphs are as follows:

"The Supreme Law or Usage which forms the safeguard of Europe is not in a state so perfect and symmetrical that the elucidation of it will bring any ease or comfort to a mind accustomed to crave for well-defined rules of conduct. It is a rough and wild-grown system, and its observance can only be enforced by opinion, and by the belief that it truly coincides with the interests of every power which is called upon to obey it; but practically, it has been made to achieve a fair portion of that security which sanguine men might hope to see resulting from the adoption of an international code. Perhaps under a system ideally formed for the safety of nations and for the peace of the world, a wrong done to one state would be instantly treated as a wrong done to all. But in the actual state of the world there is no such bond between nations. It is true that the law of nations does not stint the right of executing justice, and that any Power may either remonstrate against a wrong done to another state, great or small, or may endeavor, if so it chooses, to prevent or redress the wrong by force of arms; but the duties of states in this respect are very far from being co-extensive with their rights.

"In Europe, all states except the Five Great Powers are exempt from the duty of watching over the general safety; and even a state which is one of the five great Powers is not practically under an obligation to sustain the cause of justice unless its perception of the wrong is re-enforced by a sense of its own interests. Moreover, no state, unless it be combating for its very life, can be expected to engage in a war without a fair prospect of success. But when the three circumstances are present—when a wrong is being done against any state, great or small, when that wrong in its present or ulterior consequences happens to be injurious to one of the five great Powers, and finally, when the great Power so injured is competent to wage war with fair hopes, then Europe is accustomed to expect that the great Power which is sustaining the hurt will be enlivened by the smart of the wound, and for its own sake, as well as for the public weal, will be ready to come forward in arms, or to labor for the formation of such leagues as may be needed for upholding the cause of justice. If a power fails in this duty to itself and to Europe, it gradually becomes lowered in the opinion of mankind, and happily there is no historic lesson more true than that which teaches all rulers

that a moral degradation of this sort is speedily followed by disasters of such a kind as to be capable of being expressed in arithmetic." pp. 36, 37.

"The obligation imposed upon a great state by this Usage is not a heavy yoke, for, after all, it does no more than impel a sovereign by fresh motives and by larger sanctions, to be watchful in the protection of his own interests. It quickens his sense of honor. It warns him that if he tamely stands witnessing a wrong reckoning which awaits him in his own dishonored country, but that he will also be held guilty of a great European defection, and that his delinquency will be punished by the reproach of nations, by their scorn and distrust, and at last perhaps, by their desertion of him in his hour of trial. But, on the other hand, the Usage assures a Prince that if he will but be firm in coming forward to redress a public wrong which chances to be collaterally hurtful to his own state, his cause will be singularly ennobled and strengthened by the acknowledgment of the principle that, although he is fighting for his own people, he is also fighting for every nation in the world which is interested in putting down the wrongdoer. Of course, neither this nor any other human law or usage can have any real worth except in proportion to the respect and obedience with which it is regarded; but, since the Usage exacts nothing from any state except what is really for its own good as well as for the general weal, it is very much obeyed, and is always respected in Europe." p. 40.

"To keep alive the dread of a just and avenging war, should be the care of every statesman who would faithfully labor to preserve the peace of Europe. It is a poor use of time to urge a king or an emperor to restrain his ambition and his covetousness, for these are passions eternal, always to be looked for, and always to be combatted. For such a prince, the only good bridle is the fear of war." p. 41.

It is only by a figure of speech that the workings of such a rickety machine as this are called Law. And yet they are held to impose a certain obligation upon such nations as can be held within the circle. And they often serve the Powers as convenient pretexts and apologies for interference in the affairs of others, whether right or wrong. Some instructive views of the practical operation of this system, in the case of what are called Minor Powers, may be gathered from a cursory examination of the history of Modern Greece. About forty years ago, the people of Greece, of their own accord and by their own motion, threw off the intolerable yoke of Turkey, and declared themselves an independent nation. Thereupon, and forthwith, the Three Great Powers took the nation in charge, forbade the further attempts of Turkey to subdue them, and required of them to confine their country forever within certain narrow limits, to become a hereditary monarchy, and to choose a king for themselves from among the royal families of Europe, subject to the approval of the Three

Powers. They also assumed the right of requiring the funding of the revolutionary debt, nominally of fourteen millions of dollars, although only five millions had reached the national treasury. In 1832, the Powers interfered again, creating another debt of ten millions, of which about one million went for roads and other beneficial objects, and the rest was absorbed by the harpies of King Otho's court. In 1854, the debt had grown to sixty millions, and there was another interference of the Three Powers, resulting in a requisition that Greece should reserve annually 900,000 francs—nearly \$200,000—for her creditors, out of a revenue barely reaching four millions per annum, in a country where material civilization is far in arrear. This requirement, after some years' delay, was complied with for one year, and then followed a revolution. But Greece is still held by the bondage of this debt under the tutelage of the ever-present Three Powers, who allow no free choice to the people but to try over again the disastrous experiment so fully tried out in thirty years of unhappiness, of another hereditary dynasty, under a king subject to the approval of the Powers. And the millstone of a debt of sixty millions, for which Greece never received above one-tenth of the value, is still bound about her neck, and the yearly payment is to be coerced by the Powers, on penalty of war, and subjugation, and national extinction. Such is the working of the Political System of Europe, as organized by the Congress of Vienna, and administered by the Great Powers. Some American writers have spoken of the Holy Alliance as a thing of the past. Greece finds it a living Dominion, from whose grasp she as yet sees no possible way of escape. Perhaps some reflecting minds will trace out from this example an analysis of the principles involved in the Treaty of London, under which the Mexican republic is invaded by a European coalition to compel the payment of debts and claims even more exorbitant than those under which Greece is pressed to the earth, and will thus learn the meaning of the phrase, the extension of the Political System of Europe to the American continent.

This sodality of nations, thus imposed upon Europe by the Congress of Vienna, and administered by the Five Great Powers, or any three, or even two of them, [either England or France

being always one], assumed the right to interfere at will, with the internal policy of any state, and to require such an administration of its domestic affairs as they judged to be necessary to what was styled "the tranquility of Europe." No state was allowed to manage its own concerns or construct its own government, according to its own judgment of what was most for the welfare of its own people, but each was required to conform its economy to a pattern laid down by the managing Powers. And this prerogative of review and control was held to extend beyond the limits of the ring, and nations outside of Europe were to be coerced into conformity to the will of this overshadowing conspiracy. This tremendous machinery was guided by men of the highest sagacity and largest experience, and thoroughly devoted to its objects. They were too shrewd to attempt the reduction of all governments to the uniformity of a common pattern, for they knew that diversity is inseparable from humanity. But they evidently had an ideal form or standard of perfection, and made it their constant aim to bring all governments into as near conformity with this as circumstances would allow, and to repress all tendencies in the contrary direction. The *beau-ideal* of the Holy Alliance was an absolute monarchy, hereditary, and both imposed and maintained by military force. Constitutional monarchy, in its various grades, was recognized where it could not be avoided, with the proviso that the constitution must derive its validity from the grant of the monarch, and not by the will of the people. And then they held it to be quite competent for the sovereign to resume his grant, and set aside the constitution, whenever he thought that the interests of the monarchy required. So a legislature, with powers more or less extended, could be tolerated, provided it owed its being to the gift of the crown. But it was not allowed that the people should create a legislature, and then offer to the king the privilege of reigning under such limited prerogative as they chose to prescribe. Revolutions might be permitted to succeed, where they resulted in hereditary governments, imposed by the will of the Alliance, and maintained by military force. The antiquity of the Swiss republics, with their comparative insignificance, and perhaps the difficulty of their subjugation, permitted them to continue; but no other republic was to exist in Europe, nor elsewhere if it could



be prevented. The idea was utterly rejected, that it is in the power of a people, by their own will, and without asking leave or receiving assent from any body, to create a valid government, such that to revolt against it should be a crime by human and divine law. To this day, the reactionaries and conservatives of Europe do not allow that the authority of a government, thus originated, is of the same nature with that of one of their old monarchies. For this reason the sober mind of Europe is not shocked at the wickedness of the American secession, because they do not consider the casting off of such a government an offense against good morals. Our government is generally regarded in Europe as a mere aggregation of individuals, to and from which men may come and go at pleasure, without incurring any moral obligation or violating any moral principle.

It is upon this ground that we are to explain what appeared to Americans so shameless in the conduct of the French Emperor, when, in his letter to General Forey, he directed him to treat any government he might find in Mexico as merely provisional. The government of President Juarez is unquestionably the constitutional government of Mexico, and it has been supported by the great body of the people as such—the malcontent priests and their followers, and a few factious chiefs, only excepted. But it originated solely in the voice of the people, and neither had nor asked any other sanction than the popular will ;—and therefore Europe pronounces it only provisional, and hence liable to be replaced by another of equal authority by any faction which could get possession of the Capital, so as to wield for a moment the forms of government at the accustomed seat of government. Another point gained by this subtlety is to give color to the pretext by which Mexico is held to be bound by the acts of the transient Usurper, Miramon ; for if Juarez' government is only provisional, Miramon's had as much authority as his. And on no better ground than this, the Three Great Powers, Great Britain, France, and Spain, formed a coalition to invade Mexico, just as it was recovering from the disorders of a long revolution, in order to coerce the payment of Miramon's bonds, for which the scoundrel bankers had paid the plundering brigand only at the rate of four or five cents on the dollar. And by the same rule, if Jeff. Davis

had been smart enough to seize Washington City in 1861, and inaugurate himself as President of the United States, they might by and by be making war against us to compel the payment of his loans, for his government would have been provisional, and just as valid in fact as Mr. Lincoln's; for Europe decides in the case of Mexico that a constitutional government, sanctioned alone by the will of the people, is "only provisional."

If there had been any doubt as to the real intent of the language employed in the diplomatic correspondence of the allied Powers and in the Emperor's letter, it is all now dispelled by the action of the French commander since he got possession of the city of Mexico. He knew the object of the expedition, and what his master meant by his orders. He has treated the constitutional government of Mexico as no valid government, as a merely provisional arrangement, a *locum tenens*, until military power could come in and grant to the people a government conformed to the fundamental ideas of Europe. He first appoints by his own authority a commission of three persons, one a renegade Mexican, the instigator of the invasion, Almonte; the second, the Archbishop, a servant of the sovereign of Rome, to give the sanction of the Pope to the proceeding; the third, Salas, the most unprincipled of all the chiefs who have aided to keep Mexico in turmoil for a generation. These three convene a Council of Notables, selected by themselves, who proceed at once to declare Mexico an Empire, and appoint the Archduke Maximilian of Austria for Emperor, with the provision that, if he declines, the Emperor of France shall designate a person to be their monarch. Here we have the true intent of the ambiguous phraseology which was used throughout by the allied powers, of their intention to secure to unfortunate Mexico the blessings of a *stable* government. They meant a frame of government not originating with the people, in the exercise of their own inherent rights, and which they were always at liberty to change for good cause, but one *granted* to the people by some authority above them. It is a legitimate outgo of the political system of Europe, as adjusted by the Congress of Vienna.

We have devoted the more space to this attempted analysis of the political system of Europe, in order the better to show its

antagonism to the ideas which have been adopted in America, both concerning the origin of valid governments, and as to the mutual relations of states or nations. But few words are necessary to explain the system which exists among the nations of this continent, and to make it manifest that the two systems cannot exist together in the Western Hemisphere without creating a constant and irrepressible conflict of irreconcilable ideas. It is the fundamental idea that underlies our institutions, that the state is for the people, and not the people for the state; that the state is valued for its benefits to the people, rather than the people for the greatness it adds to the state; that the people are, in the order of nature, before the state, which they create by their will; and that, in like manner, the state is before the government, which it creates for itself, and may alter as it sees fit. Hence the stability of the government rests in the intelligence and patriotism of the people, and is promoted by whatever expands the minds and strengthens the principles of every class in society. The American Land system, by which the laborer owns the land he cultivates, and the system of Common Schools, by which every man learns to know his own rights and those of his neighbors, are natural products of the American Political System. The government neither stands on the grant of a superior, nor secures itself by keeping the people in subjection. For the sake of international comity and good neighborhood, it asks recognition, and courtesy, and justice from other nations, as its equals in rank, but would peril everything rather than concede that it owes its validity to the grant of any potentate, or depends for its continuance upon the strength of any foreign power. It would carry us over too much ground, to show in detail how perfectly such a government must shape itself to the people, and how such a people would grow up to their government, until it would become impossible to mold either the people or the government into compliance with the opposite political system. It were more practicable to exterminate them from the face of the earth than to make them patient and submissive subjects of a government imposed upon them without their consent. It is more to our present purpose to consider the workings of this political system upon the international relations of independent states. And the

first thought which suggests itself is, that each state, creating its own government for its own purposes, will necessarily have such a government as it prefers, such as it can create, can administer, and can support, and defend—and no other. And hence it does not admit the right of any combination of states to judge for another state what is best for it, or to dictate to another what it may or may not have for itself. The people living under such institutions would feel an interest in the progress of civil liberty everywhere, and would extend a cheering sympathy to any people who were struggling worthily to obtain the boon of self-government; but the nation itself would maintain a pure and impartial neutrality, unless some extreme case should arise in which our own safety was involved, or where the voice of outraged humanity might call for interposition. We would neither attempt to force such institutions upon the unwilling, nor purchase them for the incompetent. Whatever people would have them must win them; and if they would enjoy them, must keep them. In a word, the principle of non-intervention, which some statesmen are vainly endeavoring to graft upon the political system of Europe, is the natural growth of the American system, or rather, it is a necessary part of the life of society on this Western Continent—to be asserted on all occasions, and maintained at all hazards.

The European system in its full-blown development under the domination of the Holy Alliance, brought all Europe under its control. The final struggle for popular rights was made in Spain, where the Cortes adopted a constitution by their own authority, and compelled the king to accept its conditions. Ferdinand the VII appealed to the Holy Alliance to restore him to his legitimate prerogative, of governing by hereditary right, and making his people contented with such privileges as he saw fit to give them. It was a test case, and the absolutists were equal to the occasion. By their advice and consent, France sent an overwhelming army into Spain, in aid of the king, and totally broke the power of the popular party, leaving the throne as absolute as any in Europe. Europe was tranquilized, in the Vienna sense, and the Holy Alliance was at liberty to turn its attention to other continents for conquests to win, or dangers to repress.


But while these struggles had been going on in Europe, and partly in consequence of them, a great change had come over the political aspect of the New World. Our country no longer stood alone as the exponent of the American political system, and the object of absolutist jealousy. But this republic found itself at the head of a glorious sisterhood of free and independent states. The whole congeries of Spanish colonies on the continent of America, although in apparently the least possible preparation for the enjoyment of free institutions, had been first thrown loose from the control of the parent country by the breaking up of the regular government, through the ambition of Bonaparte; and having thus been compelled to assume the functions of self-government, they had severally, each by and for itself, successfully asserted and won their independence. The case is presented in a statesman-like way by Mr. Adams, when Secretary of State under President Monroe, in his letter of instructions to Mr. Anderson, the first American Minister to one of the Spanish Republics, dated May 27th, 1823:

“The revolution of the Spanish Colonies was not caused by the oppression under which they had been held, however great it had been. Their independence was first forced upon them by the temporary subjugation of Spain herself to a foreign power. They were, by that event, cast upon themselves, and compelled to establish governments of their own. Spain, through all the vicissitudes of her own revolutions, has clung to the desperate hope of retaining, or of reclaiming them to her own control; and has waged, to the extent of her power, a disastrous war, to that extent. In the mind of every rational man, it has been for years apparent that Spain can never succeed to recover her dominion where it has been abjured; nor is it possible that she can long retain the small remnant of her authority yet acknowledged in some spots of the South American continent.”

It was a great and glorious change for America, and was not unappreciated by the great men who were then at the head of affairs in this country. Mr. Webster said, in his celebrated oration at the laying of the corner stone of the Bunker Hill monument, June 17th, 1825, that “among the great events of the half century, we must respect certainly the revolution of South America; and we are not likely to overrate the importance of that revolution, either to the growth of the country itself, or to the rest of the world. When the battle of Bunker Hill was fought, the existence of South America was scarcely felt in the

civilized world. The thirteen little colonies of North America habitually called themselves the continent. Borne down by colonial subjugation, monopoly, and bigotry, those vast regions of the South were hardly visible above the horizon. But in our day there has been, as it were, a new creation. The southern hemisphere emerges from the sea. Its lofty mountains begin to lift themselves into the light of heaven; its broad and fertile plains stretch out in beauty to the eye of civilized man; and at the bidding of the voice of political liberty, the waters of darkness retire."

With the exception of the British Provinces north of us, the power of Europe was driven from the continent. From the lakes to Cape Horn, every foot of land had ceased to belong to the European political system, or to be in any way responsible for the "Balance of Power" in the Old World. Mexico, indeed, temporarily, and Brazil permanently, had adopted monarchical forms of government, but they were entirely American in interest. Fortunately, we had men in the administration of our government, who possessed both the wisdom and the patriotism to comprehend the situation, and act as the occasion required. It was the golden period of our political history. The devotion to public interests which characterized the days of the revolution had not died out, for Jefferson, Madison, Marshall, Rufus King, and many of their compatriots, were still alive. The native sagacity of our early statesmen which had baffled the diplomatic skill of Europe, had been ripened by the practical experience of thirty years in the administration of affairs at home and abroad. Private interest had not become so large as to withdraw most of the ablest men from public service. Party spirit had not eaten out the keen sense of what becomes the honor of the country. And slavery had not yet extinguished patriotism in half the states of the Union. It was in the lull of party strife called "the era of good feelings." It was the transition period between the patriotic inexperience of our infant government and the dominant selfishness of late years. Some of the men still in public life had participated in the cares of government when the indifference, if not contempt, of Europe for our insignificance was a shield to us against aggression. All of them had participated in the anxious



and critical period of the "second war of independence," by which we had at length gained the respectful consideration of the European governments. It was a crisis in our affairs, and we had men who could see its importance, and who knew how to meet it. And it is not too much to say, that if the policy which they adopted had been properly carried out by their successors, we should have been saved from many humiliations, as well as many political evils, which have been, or will be our portion.

The Holy Alliance had no thought of letting this whole continent slip out of their hands. The instant that they saw "the tranquility of Europe" restored by the suppression of popular freedom in Spain, their attention was turned towards this continent, with a determination first to resubjugate the colonies of Spain, and then to see what might be done towards breaking up the nest of dangerous principles in this country, and, if possible, put the United States into a situation where neither their doctrines nor their examples should again disturb the peace of Europe. The arrangements for this purpose were on the eve of being concluded, indeed were only waiting for the formal adhesion of England, when the sudden death of the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs laid the foundation for a change of policy in that government, which finally altered the whole course of events in Europe.

The Marquis of Londonderry, best known by the title of Lord Castlereagh, which he bore during the life of his father, died* by his own hand, in a fit of insanity, caused, it was believed, by excessive care and labor in the session of parliament then just closed. He had managed the foreign affairs of England with consummate ability during all the latter years of the great continental conflict in Europe, which ended with the battle of Waterloo, and had taken a distinguished part in all the negotiations for the readjustment of boundaries and other relations of all the countries of Europe. He was in full sympathy with the reactionary governments, and as earnest as any in favor of such measures as were thought best calculated to protect legitimate and established dynasties against all future revolutions in favor

* In August, 1822.

of popular rights or democratic ideas. For technical reasons, such as the forms of administration in England, he declined to make his government a party in form to the league of the Holy Alliance. But he acquiesced, tacitly at least, in the French invasion of Spain to suppress the Cortes. And he declared to Mr. Rush, our minister, that England would not assent to any pacification between Spain and the Spanish American states, that did not embrace the re-establishment of the supremacy of the Spanish crown.*

The death of Lord Castlereagh (Londonderry) gave the portfolio of Foreign Affairs to Mr. George Canning, who looked at public relations in a light entirely different from that seen by his predecessor. He is regarded as the most philosophical statesman that Great Britain has had during the century. An original thinker, with sound common-sense and liberal views, his character is not to be estimated without taking into consideration the circumstances and influences with which he was surrounded.† He not only declined to take part in any measures for the military coercion of the Spanish American States, but he soon came to look at the full recognition of their independence as the only practicable method of restoring peace in South America. At the earliest practicable period after getting possession of his office,

* "His lordship expressed regret that the United States viewed the question of independence in the colonies differently from England, giving as a reason the probable weight of their counsels with the colonies; so that, although my government was no formal party to the mediation, if, nevertheless, it had harmonized with England on the question of independence, the hope would have been increased of seeing the dispute healed the sooner, through influence which, from local and political causes, the United States might mutually be supposed to have with the colonies. How far it was practicable to settle it, giving back to Spain her supremacy, and granting to the colonies a just government under her sway, was not for him to say; but it was the hope to which the European Alliance still clung." Feb. 12, 1819. Rush's Memoranda, Vol. II, p. 17.

† Mr. Canning was an orator of the highest rank, as well as a wise statesman and skillful diplomatist. His predecessor's oratory was lampooned in "The Twopenny Post-Bag."

"Why is a pump like Viscount Castlereagh?
Because it is an ugly thing of wood,
That up and down its awkward arm doth play,
And coolly spout, and spout, and spout away,
In one weak, washy, everlasting flood."

and prior to the actual invasion of Spain by the French, under the Duke D'Angouleme, he intimated to the French government that "England considered the course of events as having substantially decided the question of the separation of the colonies from Spain," although the formal recognition of their independence by her might be hastened or retarded by various causes. Mr. Rush, in giving an account of his first formal diplomatic interview with Mr. Canning, which was on the 16th of August, 1823, describes the informal conversation which they held on Spanish American affairs. After the regular business of the interview was disposed of, Mr. Rush introduced the subject by referring to Mr. Canning's intimation made to France, in March, and remarked that he considered that note as a distinct avowal that England would not remain passive under any attempt by France to re-subjugate the Spanish colonies. Mr. Canning then asked Mr. Rush whether it was practicable for the United States to go hand in hand with England in such a policy. Thereupon arose a free and candid interchange of thoughts, broadly covering the whole case. Mr. Rush persistently pressed the inquiry to learn the precise intentions of England in regard to the acknowledgment of the independence of the late colonies, as he was satisfied that the course of the United States would be influenced in no small degree by this consideration. Mr. Canning said that the question of recognition was yet an open one, but finally said that he was about to send a commission of inquiry which might lead to recognition.*

We come now to the point which is of some importance, both historical and political, in its bearing on the importance to be attached to the course taken by our government. Which government, the American or the English, is entitled to the credit of taking the lead in the recognition of the Spanish-American states as independent nations? On this general question there is no uncertainty. The United States originated every step, in sending out a commission of inquiry, then in appointing consuls to these governments, and finally in conceding a full recognition of their nationality, and sending ministers to negotiate treaties of amity and commerce. All this was done before the first step

* Rush, Vol. II., pp. 400-404.

of inquiry was taken by England.* And yet Mr. Canning is said to have claimed that he "spoke the word which called nations into being in the New World, to redress the balance of the Old." And his biographer, Stapleton, labors to prove that the bold position taken by President Monroe originated in the suggestions,

* In his letter of instructions to Mr. Anderson, before referred to, Mr. Adams, in narrating and justifying the course proposed by our government, says that, "In August, 1818, a formal proposal was made to the British government for a concerted and cotemporary recognition of the independence of Buenos Ayres, then the only one of the South American provinces that had no Spanish force contending against it, within its borders; and where it therefore most unequivocally existed *in fact*. The British government declined accepting the proposal themselves, without, however, expressing any disapprobation of it; without discussing it as a question of principle, and without assigning any reason for the refusal, other than that it did not then suit with their policy. It became a subject of consideration at the deliberations of the Congress of Aix la Chapelle, in October, 1818. There is reason to believe that it disconcerted projects which were there entertained of engaging the European Alliance in actual operations against the South Americans, as it is well known that a plan for their joint mediation between Spain and her colonies, for restoring them to her authority, was actually matured, and finally failed at that place, only by the refusal of Great Britain to accede to the condition of employing force eventually against the South Americans for its accomplishment. Some dissatisfaction was manifested by several of the members of the Congress at Aix la Chapelle, at this avowal on the part of the United States, of their readiness to recognize the independence of Buenos Ayres." *Message and Documents*, March 15, 1826. House Doc. 129, p. 18.

Dates are here quite important. The resolution of the House of Representatives, calling for information on the subject, was passed the 30th of January, 1822. Mr. Clay's brilliant and commanding speeches in favor of recognition, which so electrified the civilized world, were delivered in February. Although the House at first declined, February 5, to include an allowance in the General Appropriation Bill, 33 to 77, and afterwards failed by only one vote to lay Mr. Clay's resolution on the table, 71 to 72, yet after the debate, the declaration of interest in the cause of South American independence was adopted, 134 to 12, and the pledge to support the President in his measures, passed 87 to 68. The President's Message was transmitted to Congress on the 8th of March, in which he "declared his own persuasion that the time had arrived when, in strict conformity to the law of nations, and in the fulfillment of the duties of equal and impartial justice to all parties, the acknowledgment of the independence declared by the Spanish American colonies could no longer be withheld." The appropriation was made by Congress, May 4th, and on the 17th of June, Mr. Torres was received by the President as Charge d'Affairs from the Republic of Columbia. Mr. Adams says that "the immediate consequence of our recognition was the admission of the vessels of the South American nations, under their own colors, into the ports of the principal maritime nations of Europe." Doc. p. 21.


and was strengthened by the promised support of Mr. Canning. And it has been the policy of some American politicians and writers on public affairs to take the same ground, for the purpose of depreciating the value of Mr. Monroe's declaration. We have examined, with as much care and as much impartiality as we were able, all the evidence within our reach, and we have no hesitation in giving judgment that the course of our government was in no sense originated by the forethought or the sagacity of British statesmen, or emboldened by their courage, or the expectation of their countenance and support, but is to be credited in full to the wisdom and sagacity and patriotic courage of the American administration. And any attempt in any quarter to disparage the importance, or discredit the independence of this proceeding, is unjust and wrongful in Englishmen, and unpatriotic and mean in Americans. Of course it is impossible to present, in these pages, a detailed summary of the evidence on which this judgment rests. We can only indicate a few of the leading points in the case.

Mr. Stapleton, in his elaborate memoir of the public life of Mr. Canning, represents that statesman as having a desire to recognize the Spanish American states, with a view to counteract certain apprehended schemes of the French government, who might seek to acquire some of those territories as an indemnity for the cost of the invasion which restored absolutism in Spain. "It was with this view," he says, "that towards the latter end of August, 1823," he "*sounded Mr. Rush*, as to whether the moment were not arrived when the two governments" "might not come to some understanding with each other on the subject," so as to unite in some statement of principles, &c. Memoir, Vol. II., p. 24. And this account of the affair is followed and substantially copied by the *North American Review* for 1856, Vol. 82, p. 487.

Now we have Mr. Rush's own account of this interview, from which it is plain that it was Mr. Rush who introduced the subject, and who not only "*sounded*" Mr. Canning, but interrogated him, and persisted in seeking the desired information as to his views, and pressed upon him the direct and simple and American method of dealing with the difficulty, by immediate recognition.

as the wisest and safest policy. And it is impossible to read Mr. Rush's book without the conviction that he is a most considerate writer, conscientiously careful to make his statements in the most exact accordance with truth, and singularly free from a desire to magnify his own merits or glorify his own abilities, or in any way to exalt his own reputation at the expense of the truth, or of any other person. There is no modern writer whose statements bear more convincing marks of calm and exact verity.

It was on the 16th of August, 1823, that Mr. Rush had his first formal diplomatic conference with the new secretary. It was held at the particular request of Mr. Rush, for the especial purpose of opening negotiations on five or six subjects, (all unconnected with Spanish America), which had been particularly and freshly committed to him by his government. He says of the conference, "The proper object of it being over, I transiently asked him," Mr. Canning, "some question concerning the aspect of affairs in Spain, as the defection of Ballasteros from the constitutional cause had given rise to much apprehension of final disaster." Receiving a general response in the same tenor, Mr. Rush remarked that there would be one consolation left, that Great Britain would not allow the Powers to stop the emancipation of the colonies. This remark he based upon Mr. Canning's letter to the French minister, dated March 31, 1823, which simply expressed the belief of England that no attempt would be made by France to bring any of the Spanish colonies under her dominion, either by conquest or cession. Mr. Canning, without a positive assent, asked what the American government would say to a joint movement with England for this object. Mr. Rush replied that he had no instructions on that point, but would make the inquiry informally if it was desired, but could do it with more advantage if he knew the precise position of England towards those countries, especially as to the material point of acknowledging their independence. Mr. Canning admitted his own belief that America was lost to Europe, but England must for the present leave the question open for Spain to do what she could towards making terms with the colonies. Mr. Rush, "wishing to be still more especially enlightened," pressed the inquiry whether England was "contemplating any steps which



had reference to the recognition." Mr. Canning answered that it was proposed to send out a commission of inquiry to Mexico, such as the United States sent in 1817 to Buenos Ayres. And then he suggested the specific proposal that the two countries should, in some unobjectionable way, cause it to be known that they were agreed in the opinion that France ought not to extend her efforts at subjugation to the colonies. Mr. Rush expressed no opinion either for or against this suggestion, but promised to communicate it to his government. See Memoranda, Vol. II., pp. 397-404.

Such, we have no doubt, is a true history of the "sounding" process, as it took place on the 16th of August. On the 22d, Mr. Canning, in turn, "sounded Mr. Rush," by an "unofficial and confidential" note, renewing the suggestion which the latter had finally drawn from him, of a joint declaration against further attempts to subjugate the colonies, and inquiring whether he considered himself authorized to sign a convention, or to exchange ministerial notes to that effect. Mr. Rush replied, next day, that what his government most earnestly desired was to see those states "received into the family of nations by the Powers of Europe, and especially by Great Britain;" that the sentiments in the note were shared by the United States, who considered the recovery of the colonies of Spain to be entirely hopeless, and would "regard as highly unjust, and as fruitful of disastrous consequences, any attempt on the part of any European power, to take possession of them by conquest, by cession, or on any other ground or pretext whatever," but that his instructions were silent as to any manner in which these principles should be avowed. We cannot go over the whole of this negotiation, Mr. Rush's account of which extends to above forty pages; but the intelligent reader will see in the sentence last quoted, the spirit, and almost the very language of President Monroe's declaration, issued three months afterwards. Whoever examines it attentively will see that Mr. Rush adhered, throughout the correspondence and conferences, to the one indispensable point, of recognition, as the preliminary, declining to take any step or agree to any measure until that was accorded; while he at the same time maintained a scrupulous regard for our friendly relations with both France and

Spain. On the other hand, Mr. Canning continually avoided the promise of recognition at once, evidently with a view to secure advantages which he hoped to gain for England by the delay. The farthest he could go was to say that England would acknowledge the independence of the colonies at once, "in case France should employ force" to subjugate them, or if Spain "should attempt to put a stop to the trade of Britain" with them. And he finally closed the conference on the 26th of November, by informing Mr. Rush that he had judged it best for England to act alone, and had accordingly already entered into communication with France on the subject. He therefore wished the whole affair, as far as concerned a united movement with this country, to remain as it had been, informal and unofficial—"not as a proposition already made, but as evidence of the nature of one which it would have been his desire to make," had Mr. Rush been empowered to respond to it.

On the 2d of December, 1823, President Monroe communicated his annual Message to Congress, in which he laid down, broadly and clearly, the doctrine held by this government concerning the new relation subsisting between this continent and the nations of Europe. After alluding with deep interest to the struggles for liberty in Greece, and to the disappointment of our expectations in regard to Spain and Portugal, he proceeds to observe—

"Of events in that quarter of the globe with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European Powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries, or make preparations for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere, we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the Allied Powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved with so much expense of blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed most unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations subsisting between the United States and these Powers, to declare,

that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration, and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition, for the purposes of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between these Governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur, which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security."

He also informs Congress that in the pending negotiations with Russia, which he had entered upon, through a desire, "by this friendly proceeding, of manifesting the great value which we have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor, and our solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his government," he had judged the occasion a proper one "for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered subjects for future colonization by any European power."

These paragraphs, taken together, present three distinct articles of faith or principles of action, growing out of the newly won independence of the Spanish American countries.

1. That the American continents, (leaving out the islands), are henceforth not to be considered subject to any future colonization by any European nation.

2. That we shall consider any attempt on the part of the European powers to extend their political system to any portion of this hemisphere as "dangerous to our peace and safety," and of course to be counteracted or provided against as we shall deem advisable in any case.

3. That for any European power to interfere with any American government for the purpose of oppressing or dictating to them unjustly, or of controlling their destiny by force or threats, would be viewed by us as "the manifestation of an unfriendly

disposition towards the United States," which we should be called upon to notice by protest or remonstrance, or in such way as we should think our honor and interest required.

This declaration, so plain, so explicit, and so firm, electrified Europe, which had begun to learn, by the results of the war of 1812, that the United States were to be respected for their strength, even where they were hated for their free institutions. Indeed, it may be said to have astonished both continents, by the boldness of front which it assumed. Mr. Rush tells us that "when the message arrived in London, the whole document excited great attention. It was upon all tongues, the press was full of it, the Spanish American deputies were overjoyed, Spanish American securities rose in the market, and the safety of the new states from European coercion was considered as no longer doubtful." Vol. II., p. 458. Mr. Stapleton, the biographer of Canning, says that "coupled with the refusal of Great Britain to take part in a Congress, similar to those which had met at Vienna, Aix la Chapelle, Laybach, and Verona, it effectually put an end to the project of assembling one, since, with the intentions of Great Britain and the United States thus unequivocally declared, such an assembly would have been utterly unable to have given effect to its own resolutions." Vol. II., p. 40.

In the debate on the reply to the King's speech at the opening of Parliament, February 6th, 1823, Mr. Brougham said, "The question with regard to South America was now, he believed, disposed of, or nearly so; for one event had recently happened, than which no event had ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude, over all the freemen of Europe; that event which was decisive on the subject, was the language had with respect to Spanish America in the speech or message of the President of the United States to the Congress." He proceeded to state, as an indisputable fact, that "Ferdinand had been promised by the Emperor Alexander, that if the King of Spain would throw off the constitutional fetters by which he was trammelled, he would assist him in recovering his transatlantic dominions." "In that case, however, assistance would not have been given openly, but in a covert, underhand way." And he concluded this part of the subject by expressing his belief that "if the

declaration of the United States did not put an end to such attempts on the independence of the colonies; if a vigorous resistance were not opposed to such machinations, sooner or later, the liberties of those colonies would fall a sacrifice to the intrigues of Spain and the Allied Powers." Stapleton, pp. 46-47.

Sir James Mackintosh, June 15th, 1824, on the Recognition of the Spanish American States, in the House of Commons, bears this testimony to its importance:

"Although the attention of the House is chiefly directed to the acts of our own government, it is not foreign to the purpose of my argument to solicit them, for a few moments, to consider the admirable message sent on the 2d of December, 1823, by the President of the United States to the Congress of the great Republic. I heartily rejoice in the perfect agreement of that message with the principles professed by us to the French minister, and afterwards to all the great Powers of Europe, whether military or maritime, and to the great English State beyond the Atlantic. I am not anxious to ascertain whether the message was influenced by our communication, or was merely the result of similarity of principle, and coincidence of interest. The United States had, at all events, long preceded us in the recognition. They sent consuls and commissioners two years before us, who found the greater part of South America quiet and secure, and in the agitations of the remainder met with no obstacles to friendly intercourse. This recognition neither interrupted amicable relations with Spain, nor occasioned remonstrance from any Power in Europe. They solemnly renew that declaration in the message before me. That wise government, in grave but determined language, and with that reasonable and deliberate tone, which becomes true courage, proclaims the principles of her policy, and makes known the cases in which the care of her own safety will compel her to take up arms for the defense of other states. I have already observed the coincidence with the declarations of England; which, indeed, is perfect, if allowance be made for the deeper, or, at least, more immediate interest in the independence of South America, which near neighborhood gives to the United States. This coincidence of the two great English commonwealths, (for so I delight to call them, and I heartily pray that they may be forever united in the cause of justice and liberty), cannot be contemplated without the utmost pleasure by every enlightened citizen of either. Above all, Sir, there is one coincidence between them, which is, I trust, of happy augury to the whole civilized world:—they have both declared their neutrality in the American contest, as long as it shall be confined to Spain and her former colonies, or as long as no foreign power shall interfere."

Mr. Webster, in his great speech in Congress, on the Panama Mission, April 11th, 1826, expressed his entire concurrence in the sentiment expressed by other gentlemen, that "this Declaration of Mr. Monroe was wise, reasonable, and patriotic." And he had understood that "it was considered, weighed, and dis-

tinctly approved by every one of the President's advisers at that time." He adds, that "it met with the entire concurrence and the hearty approbation of the country. The tone which it uttered found a corresponding response in the heart of the free people of the United States." And he thus eloquently describes its general reception and effect:

"The people saw, and they rejoiced to see, that on a fit occasion, our weight had been thrown into the right scale, and that, without departing from our duty, we had done something useful, something effectual, for the cause of civil liberty. One general glow of exultation, one universal feeling of the gratified love of liberty, one conscious and proud perception of the consideration which the country possessed, and of the respect and honor which belonged to it, pervaded all bosoms. Possibly, the public enthusiasm went too far; it certainly did go far. But, Sir, the sentiment which this declaration inspired was not confined to ourselves. Its force was felt everywhere, by all those who could understand its object and foresee its effect. In that very House of Commons, of which the gentleman from South Carolina has spoken with such commendation, how was it received? Not only, Sir, with approbation, but, I may say, with no little enthusiasm. While the leading minister [Mr. Canning] expressed his entire concurrence in the sentiments and opinions of the American President, his distinguished competitor [Mr. Brougham] in that popular body, less restrained by official decorum, and more at liberty to give utterance to all the feelings of the occasion, declared that no occasion had ever created greater joy, exultation, and gratitude among all the free men in Europe; that he felt pride in being connected by blood and language with the people of the United States; that the feeling disclosed by the message became a great, a free, and an independent nation; and that he hoped his own country would be prevented by no mean pride, or paltry jealousy, from following so noble and glorious an example."

Such a declaration, so uttered, and received with such distinguished consideration, and followed by so momentous results, ought not to be regarded as of trifling significance or of transient authority. By it the United States took the position which of right belonged to them, as the first of American republics, the proper representative of American principles, the faithful defender of American interests. It was as Mr. Edward Livingston termed it, "a pledge to the world," and involved national obligations and responsibilities which will never die out, so long as we remain a free republic. For the obligations assumed by nations do not die with those who incurred them, or cease to bind because not duly valued by a succeeding generation. It became and is to us, in our relations with both Europe and America, the point of honor, in losing which, we become a base nation, for honor is

the elasticity of nations, as patriotism is the faith of their citizens. It is to be regretted that so many of our own politicians, from one motive and another, have either grievously misapprehended the import of the declaration, or have been insensible of its importance as well as of its permanent force. The learned and judicious compilers of Appleton's *Cyclopedia* have correctly pronounced it "a platform of principle on this important subject, which has been approved by the prominent statesmen of the country, from the time of its proclamation to the present."

It was perhaps unfortunate that the Monroe Doctrine, shortly after its promulgation, but under a change of political party tactics, became mixed up with the discussions concerning the Congress of Panama. Narrow-minded partisans, on the one side and the other, thought it necessary to attack or defend the administration by expanding or narrowing the scope of this doctrine, until it finally seemed to many that the Panama Congress was the culmination of the Monroe Doctrine, which perished when that failed. Whereas the Panama Congress was, at the most, but a measure designed to apply and carry out the Monroe Doctrine, if found advisable in a certain connection.

Mr. Benton, in his "Abridgment of the Debates," makes a note to this part of President Monroe's Message, quoting a passage from President Adams's Panama Message, where he states it as one of the objects of consultation at the proposed Congress, whether it was advisable to form "an agreement between all the parties represented at this meeting, that each will guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders;" and says this is "an authoritative exposition of the scope and extent of the Monroe Doctrine." Whereas, the exclusion of European colonization was but one of three distinct points of the Monroe Doctrine, and the measure suggested by Mr. Adams, so far from defining the "extent and scope," was merely an application of the doctrine to a transient occasion. The Administration saw indications of a tendency among the new republics to fling themselves upon the protection of our government, without proposing to make use of their own resources for their own defense. And they were anxious to have the conference so managed as to lead these infant nations to a

manly assumption of the dignity of independence, teaching them to feel its responsibilities, by practising its duties of self-assertion and self protection, as well as to enjoy its benefits. And to effect this result, they projected the agreement referred to. But that was not itself the Monroe Doctrine, nor did it determine either the "scope and extent" of the doctrine, or the course to which it might lead our government at other times or under other circumstances.

Mr. Benton further describes the occasion of the declaration; that the "Holy Alliance for the maintenance of the order of things which they had established in Europe, took it under advisement to extend their care to the young American republics of Spanish origin, and to convert them into monarchies, to be governed by sovereigns of European stocks—such as the Holy Allies might put upon them. It was against the extension of this European system to the two Americas that Mr. Monroe protested." And the *North American Review* for 1856, in an article displaying no inconsiderable acquaintance with historical facts pertaining to the question, says of the declaration:

"Originated for the purpose of meeting a particular conjuncture of events, it finds in them alone its real purport and justification. Wise and sensible with reference to the circumstances of the time at which it was promulgated, it ceased to be of any force even as a Presidential recommendation, as soon as the crisis which called it forth had passed." Vol. 82, p. 489.

It is true that the occasion of the Monroe Declaration was as is described. But the *cause* was the antagonism of the two political systems of Europe and America, and the object was not merely to prevent the present danger of invasion, but to warn off the incompatible system from ever attempting to force itself upon this continent. The danger was transient, but the *cause* of the danger was permanent, and the principle enunciated was of general application, as long as the cause remains, in the existence of an incompatible system, which its supporters desired to make universal. The utterances of great principles which are most effective, are commonly made upon occasions. So it is with the scriptures of truth, The law of nations has been wrought out and formed into a tolerably logical system of general principles, solely through the methods by which governments have

met occasions. And to argue that great principles put forth, like those of the Monroe Doctrine, to meet an occasion, therefore "cease to be of any force" "as soon as the crisis which called it forth had passed," is to bury out of sight all the lessons of history and all the wisdom derived from human experience. The Monroe Doctrine was not so understood by those who advanced it. The meditated intervention or invasion, and even the international conference which was to arrange for it, were stifled in their inception by this bold declaration of the determination of a great people. The danger which called forth the utterance passed away at the instant that word was proclaimed. But the administration, which sent forth so potent a declaration, intended that it should serve for the future as well as the present. This is proved by the earnestness with which Mr. Monroe reiterated the Doctrine, with its reasons, after the existing danger had passed away. Speaking of the Spanish American States, whose independence was not yet acknowledged by Europe, the Message to Congress of December 7th, 1824, says:

"The deep interest which we take in their independence, which we have acknowledged, and in their enjoyment of all the rights incident thereto, especially in the very important one of *instituting their own governments*, has been declared, and is known to the world. Separated as we are from Europe by the great Atlantic Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of the European Governments, nor in the causes which produce them. *The Balance of Power between them, into whichever scale it may turn in its various vibrations, cannot affect us.* It is the interest of the United States to preserve the most friendly relations with every power, and on conditions fair, equal, and applicable to all. But in regard to our neighbors our situation is different. It is impossible for the European Governments to interfere in their concerns, especially in those alluded to,"—[of *instituting their own governments*]"—"which are vital, without affecting us; indeed, the motive which might induce such interference in the present state of the war between the parties, if war it may be called, would appear to be equally applicable to us. It is gratifying to know that some of the Powers with whom we enjoy a very friendly intercourse, and to whom these views have been communicated, have appeared to acquiesce in them."

This settles the question as to the scope and extent of the Monroe Doctrine, and the permanent force which it was intended to possess. Mr. Monroe here used the technical phrase, "Balance of Power," to designate the "political system" which he would spurn. It was not merely the defeat of the threatened invasion that he aimed at, nor even a counterblast to the Holy

Alliance that he wished to put forth. But he would separate us forever from the complications of the Balance of Power in Europe, and vindicate forever the right of American nations to construct their own governments according to their own views of their own welfare, without the liability of interference by other governments intent upon serving their own interest. The great deliberation and forethought with which our government formed its conclusions, as well as the independence of European suggestion or influence with which it acted, is shown by the correspondence which the President held with Mr. Jefferson, at a date before it was possible for him to have learned anything definite concerning Mr. Canning's intentions as to recognition. An extract of a letter from the Sage of Monticello to Mr. Monroe, dated the 24th of October, 1823, shows also the views entertained by both of these learned and experienced statesmen, as to the breadth of scope and permanence of application of the principles under consideration :

"The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation, since that of independence. That made us a nation; *this sets our compass, and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time.* And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. *Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.* America has a set of interests, (North and South,) distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should, therefore, have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe; the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism; our endeavors should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom."

The *National Intelligencer*, a paper in which we used to look only for the elevated utterances of an enlightened patriotism, had an editorial Article in its issue of March 11th, 1863, designed to show that the Monroe Doctrine was nothing more than "a caveat addressed to the Holy Alliance, and so of merely temporary import." And it concludes that,

"The contingency which it was instituted to meet never occurred, and hence there was no necessity for its enforcement. We have no disposition to call it a *brutum fulmen*, or to disparage the patriotic impulse to which it owed its origin; but it no longer exists save as a Presidential precedent which Congress declined to endorse. The creature of circumstances, it perished so soon as the circumstances disappeared which gave it life and activity. In a similar juncture, it would remain for the wisdom of the country to decide, upon a similar course, if that should be considered the most expedient and proper."

This Article has been supposed to have a common origin with the more elaborate disquisition in the *North American Review* for April, 1856, the views and arguments being much alike, and coming to a similar conclusion, which is thus expressed in the *Review* :

“While, therefore, the Monroe Doctrine with regard to forcible intervention was still a living question, it failed to meet the sanction of Congress, in whose judgment it seemed at least prudent to delay the adoption of any measures corroborative of the President’s suggestions, until such intervention had actually taken place. The declaration of the President did not commit the policy of the country to any specific action in the premises. It rested with Congress to give it life and activity, and this Congress declined to do. Upon the wisdom of this decision we do not undertake to pronounce; we merely state the facts, for the purpose of drawing the conclusion that this branch of the Monroe Doctrine is not a living and substantive principle of our governmental policy. In case, however, of any emergency similar to that which prompted the declaration of Mr. Monroe, it would be competent for Congress to resuscitate and enforce the principle he announced, not because it was the doctrine of Mr. Monroe, but because it might be deemed wise and expedient *at the time*. Let the dead past bury its dead. To act in the living present is as sound a maxim in public affairs as in private life.” Vol. 82, page 493.

It is a mistake, into which we are surprised that so able a statesman as General Cass has also fallen, to suppose that the Monroe Doctrine lacks any element of force or authority in consequence of not having been formally confirmed or enacted by Congress. It is a matter that pertains exclusively to the President, and his declaration gives it complete validity. By the distribution of powers in our frame of government, questions of international relation and diplomacy, except the declaration of war, are committed to the executive department. A resolution of approval, or even an act of Congress, may sometimes be of value, in any emergency, to show that the representatives of the people by states and districts are in full accord with the President, who acts for the whole nation as a unit. But the nation is as fully committed, and foreign powers are at liberty and bound to recognize our national determination on such a point, in a declaration of the President of the United States, as though the matter had been solemnly enacted by both Houses of Congress, and even ratified by the people in town meeting all over the country.

But it is equally a mistake to suppose that the Holy Alliance,

the Balance of Power, or the Political System of Europe, are no longer of concern to us, or that the danger is passed of a European invasion for the purpose of dictating to American nations the form of government under which they may live. If the Holy Alliance were indeed utterly abrogated and forgotten, it would not therefore follow that there is no longer reason to fear the introduction of the European system of politics in this hemisphere. The Balance of Power is still the central idea of European statesmanship. The doctrine still prevails, that rights are not inherent in the people, but granted to them by the crown or the conqueror; and that it cannot be a valid or "stable" government which has been created solely by the will of the people, and holds its authority from no higher source than "the consent of the governed." Unhappy Greece, which succumbed to the European system, is at this day as destitute of the blessings of good government as the most unfortunate of the American republics which rejected that system. And every nation in Europe stands liable to interference from its neighbors, for ends and with purposes lying outside of the mutual relations between it and the interfering powers. Nor were the statesmen of Europe ever more eager than they are to-day, to make their system of policy as dominant in the New World as it is in the Old. Those persons are doubtless greatly mistaken who imagine that the Great Rebellion was inaugurated without help or counsel from Europe; or that the confident reliance upon European help sprung only from the heated imaginations of the arch traitors; or that the instant recognition of belligerent rights in the rebels was a sudden after-thought, suggested at the moment; or that the command of vast resources in Europe, by the rebels, was merely a matter of private arrangement with Messrs. Spence and Laird, and their associates. Great effects require adequate causes. It is hardly supposable that the ready coalition and instant action of the three powers, England, France, and Spain, which united in the invasion of Mexico for the purpose of imposing a government upon that free people, were the effect merely of a sudden resolve to improve an unlooked-for opportunity. We must rather believe that there was, somewhere, a pre-existing concert of design, to help the rebellion into full being, and thus make an op-

portunity, while our government was embarrassed, to overthrow the Monroe Doctrine, and get at once a firm footing on this continent for the political system of Europe. It will require a succinct but careful examination of this Mexican affair, to show precisely the present position of our government in regard to the Monroe Doctrine in its practical applications under the existing aspect of affairs in Europe.

Almost simultaneously with the attack on Fort Sumter, as if by one and the same impulse, Spain obtained possession of the eastern provinces of St. Domingo, through the treachery of the President Santana, and made that fine island again a colony, our own government quietly acquiescing in this first grand outrage against the Monroe Doctrine. On the 29th of June, 1861, Mr. Corwin, our minister to Mexico, called the attention of our government to the inklings he had heard of a project of intervention in Mexican affairs by France and England; and he asks how that will affect the great idea of free government on this continent, and exclaims: "Surely American statesmen should be awake to even a suspicion that such portentous events are possible." He reasons: "The towering ambition of Napoleon to regulate Europe, when it shall have been gratified in that quarter, will seek to dazzle the world by impressing upon this continent the idea of French glory and French supremacy." That wild suggestion is now history. Mr. Seward replied, August 24th, that "This government cherishes the actual independence of Mexico as a cardinal object, to the exclusion of all foreign intervention, * * yet the present moment does not seem to me an opportune one for personal reassurance of the policy of the government to foreign nations. Prudence requires that, in order to surmount the evils of faction at home, we should not unnecessarily provoke debates with foreign countries, but rather repair, as speedily as possible, the prestige which those evils have impaired." Wisdom would have dictated, what experience has sadly confirmed, that the national "prestige" would be best maintained by a frank and firm communication of our unalterable adhesion to the positions of Mr. Monroe. Instead of which, Mr. Seward wrote on the same day to Mr. Adams, our minister to England, to ascertain if the British government will forbear hostilities against Mexico, on

condition that we should aid the latter in the payment of certain claims. A month later, Sept. 24th, he instructed Mr. Adams "to inform the government of Great Britain that this government looks with deep concern to the subject of the armed movement," then publicly talked of, and to ask "for such explanations of it as her Majesty may feel at liberty to give," but grounding the request, not on the positions of the Monroe Doctrine, but on "the intimations we have already given in regard to an assumption of the payment of interest on the Mexican debt." In a like spirit he wrote to Mr. Dayton, March 3d, 1861:

"We have acted with moderation and with good faith towards the three Powers which invited our co-operation in their combined expedition to that distracted and unhappy country. We have relied upon their disclaimers of all political designs against the Mexican republic. But we cannot shut out from our sight the indications which, unexplained, are calculated to induce a belief that the government of France has lent a favoring ear to Mexican emissaries, who have proposed to subvert the republican American system in Mexico, and to import into that country a throne and even a monarch from Europe.

"You will intimate to M. Thouvenot that rumors of this kind have reached the President, and awakened some anxiety on his part. You will say that you are not authorized to ask explanations, but you are sure that if any can be made, which will be calculated to relieve that anxiety, they will be very welcome, inasmuch as the United States desire nothing so much as to maintain a good understanding and cordial relations with the government and people of France.

"It will hardly be necessary to do more in assigning your reasons for this proceeding on your part than to say that we have more than once, and with perfect distinctness and candor, informed all the parties to the alliance that we cannot look with indifference upon any avowed intervention for political ends in a country so near and so closely connected with us as Mexico." p. 218. *Mexican Doc.*, April, 1862.

This deprecatory, apologetic, almost fawning approach to the British and French governments, contrasts with the manly tone of a better day. In the year 1825, the government of France sent a large fleet to the American seas without giving notice to this government, or any explanation of the object. Mr. Clay, then Secretary of State under President J. Q. Adams, instructed Mr. Brown, our minister, Oct. 25, 1825, to inform the French government that the President expects that "the purpose of any similar movement hereafter," should be frankly communicated to this government. And he added that "if any sensibility should be manifested to what the French minister may choose to regard

as suspicions entertained here," he was to disavow those suspicions, but at the same time recapitulate the circumstances that gave apparent force to our surprise as to the objects of the movement. Mr. Brown replied, Jan. 10, 1826, that he had, "in the most delicate and friendly manner, put it to the Baron de Damas," the French Secretary, that in case France should again send out an unusual force, "its design and object should be communicated to the government of the United States." The Baron de Damas explained the peculiar circumstances of the case, and promised, in behalf of France, that, "in future, the United States should be duly apprised of the objects of every such squadron sent into their vicinity." That promise has never been vacated, and its fulfillment should have been directly and categorically demanded by us on the first demonstrations towards the invasion of Mexico. But no such demand was made. On the contrary, Mr. Dayton was directly inhibited from asking any explanations whatever. And he was directed, April 22d, 1862, to say that "M. Thouvenel's assurances on the subject of Mexico are eminently satisfactory to the President."

It is believed that our ministers abroad, Messrs. Adams, Dayton, Corwin, and Schurtz, did all that was becoming their station to do, to impress upon the administration the true objects of the coalition, the importance of our own interests that were imperiled, and the hollowness of the pretexts with which we were turned off. That it was the intention of the coalition to effect a change of government in Mexico, was notorious to all Europe. It was impossible for our ministers to shut their eyes upon facts so patent. We find Mr. Dayton, in a letter to Mr. Seward, June 5th, 1862, after some repetition of M. Thouvenel's fallacious disclaimers, adding with evident humiliation :

"It may be difficult to reconcile the published opinions of the commissioners acting for England and Spain in Mexico with these declarations of the French government ; but your original dispatch instructed me to say that I was not authorized to demand explanations, though the government would be happy to receive them. These explanations have been freely given ; if they conflict with what has been said and done elsewhere, I have not felt at liberty, under my instructions, to make such conflict the subject of comment.

"Were it supposed, however, that France proposed to change the form of government, and establish a monarchy in a republic next to and adjoining our own, it is not to be doubted that, upon every just principle of international law

or comity between states, we would have the right to demand explanations. Nor do I think that France would have felt disposed to resist such right. The explanations, however, such as they are, have been volunteered by them, not demanded by us."

The whole correspondence, as far as published, between our government and those of England, France, and Spain, makes upon us the impression of a most manifest desire on our part not to see anything objectionable in the proceedings of those Powers, and a very friendly willingness on their part to make general disclaimers of any improper designs. There appears an extreme readiness on our part to accept such ambiguous disclaimers for a great deal more than they expressed, and a careful avoidance of what was our obvious course if we were in earnest, which was, to ask the allied Powers what were their objects, and what they intended to do to attain them. This direct request was what we had a just right to make, and to insist upon a frank and full explanation. The treaty of London, for the invasion of Mexico, was signed on the 31st of October, and the ratifications were exchanged November 15th, 1861. The coalition agreed to send a combined naval and military force sufficient to seize and occupy the fortresses of Mexico, and for other operations suitable to the object; and they engage "not to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of a nature to prejudice the right of the Mexican nation to choose and to constitute freely the form of its government." This carefully studied phraseology is to be interpreted by the results now passing before our eyes.

It would lead us over too much ground for the present purpose, to show by sample citations, that the coalition against Mexico had for its object the extinction of the Monroe Doctrine, by the actual establishment of the "political system of Europe" on this continent by military force, and that it was a matter of mutual expectation and calculation, that the effect of the invasion should certainly be the establishment of a government in Mexico, different from that in existence under President Juarez, and so far conformed to European models as to constitute, according to their ideas, "a stable government." M. Billaut's speech in the French Chamber, on the 26th of June, 1862, after expressing the determination not to treat with Juarez, exclaimed,—“Let this



Mexican government disappear before the force of France, or let it take a more serious form, which may offer some security for the future." And the Emperor, July 3d, 1862, in his personal instructions to General Forey, on the line of conduct which he was to follow in Mexico, directs him to "declare that everything is provisional," meaning that the existing government is to be considered only informal and temporary, and without permanent authority. And when he should have reached Mexico, he was to take measures "with the principal persons who have embraced our cause," "with the view of organizing a provisional government," composed, of course, of such parties only; the pretext being to "aid" the Mexicans in establishing "a government which might have some chance of stability;" and the assumption being, that it is not competent for a people to create such a government by their own will alone, unless it is granted to them by the emperor, or in some other way imposed and supported by military force. In the same letter, the Emperor gives the information of the ulterior object of the invasion; to head off the United States, and curtail the growing power of this republic, so that we may not "seize possession of all the Mexican Gulf, dominate from thence the Antilles, as well as South America, and be the sole dispenser of the products of the New World." And he anticipates that, "if a stable government is constituted with the assistance of France, we shall" have restored to the "Latin race on the other side of the ocean its strength and prestige," and "we shall have established our beneficent influence in the center of America." Coupled with all this is a special injunction as to the interests of religion;—by religion meaning the Church of Rome, which is the principal thing to be regarded in this whole programme of deceit and wrong.

There is not in all history a more shameless disregard of professions made and pledges accepted, than the manner in which the Emperor of France has trampled on all that our administration credulously assumed as his promises of respect to the wishes of the people of Mexico, in any changes of government which he should promote. His general in command, in connection with the corrupt Saligny, the French minister resident, proceeded to create a new government of three persons by his own sole author-

ity and will; these summon an assembly of notables, chosen and designated only by themselves, without the shadow of a form of consulting the will of the Mexican people; and this assembly forthwith establishes a hereditary monarchy, designating Prince Maximilian as Emperor, who accepts the appointment, relying on the French army to support him in the throne. And this is now said by the Court Journal of Vienna, *Memorial Diplomatique*, to be the carrying out of a proposal which was made by the French Emperor, so long ago as October, 1861, in the dark days of this republic which followed the first defeat at Bull Run. The eagerness of most of the European governments to congratulate that of France upon the success of the invasion, attests the importance of the movement, and is a general recognition of its real object, the overthrow of the Monroe Doctrine, and the extension of the political system of Europe to this continent. As the case now stands, all Europe, except Russia, is virtually enlisted in this scheme. And thus far, the apparent success is complete. The republican government, instituted by the people, is overthrown, and in its place is a hereditary monarchy, imposed from without, and maintained by military force, dictated by the powers of Europe, and above all sanctioned by the Pope, and devoted to the interests of the Church of Rome. Says the London *Times* of August 22:

"Strictly speaking, the French army, though composed exclusively of French soldiers, did but represent what are called "troops of execution" in the administration of confederate Germany. The sentence of Europe had gone forth against Mexico, and she was put under the ban of Christendom. As regarded the actual judgment on her offenses, England and Spain were not only of one mind with France, but were originally engaged even in the execution of the sentence. It is not conceivable that under any government whatever the Mexican should fall of being better ruled than before, and if France and America can make Mexico a state in which life and property are secure, and public obligations respected, they will certainly leave Europe and Mexico their debtors.

The same paper had said on the 11th—

"The good or ill that may accrue to the Emperor Napoleon from his success must depend upon the motives which have guided him, and the manner in which he may use it, but it would be vain to deny that the feeling of the merchants of London is that on the whole, so far as the affair has proceeded, he has done a great service, both political and commercial, to the world—political, in counteracting the previous action of Spain in extinguishing the Monroe Doctrine; and

commercial, in restoring the intercourse of nations with a territory which, from its geographical position and mineral wealth, can claim a general and almost exceptional importance."

It is not to be expected that the pages of a quarterly review should keep pace with the daily developments of a movement still in the height of its progress. Enough has already appeared to convince every intelligent American, and to determine the future judgment of impartial history, that the whole belongs to one scheme, that its design was hostile to the honor and safety of the United States, that its objects reached far beyond the security of the Mexican bonds, that it was a conspiracy of European powers to force the political system of Europe upon the American states, and establish here the same right of interference, dictation, and coercion over the feebler nations which has so long been maintained in Europe. Whether it shall yet be proved or not, that the original plot embraced and brought on the rebellion; there cannot remain a doubt that the coalition of England, France, and Spain, was determined on, and carried into effect, solely in consequence of the supposed inability of the United States at the moment to insist on the Monroe Doctrine. It is equally evident that the final success of the whole programme hinges upon the result of the first step, the breaking up of the American Union. If that fails, the whole fails. The apprehension of possible failure may explain the change in the policy of the Palmerston administration, in withdrawing the British forces from the actual invasion of Mexico, and allowing it to be extensively believed that the coalition is at an end, when in truth the treaty of London is still unbroken and in full force. Louis Napoleon, and Forey, and Almonte are but the agents of the coalition, in carrying out the "other operations" authorised and provided for in the treaty.* Both the English and American people ought to understand that the British government has with-

* "The commanders of the allied forces shall be, moreover, authorized to execute the other operations which may be considered, on the spot, most suitable to effect the object specified in the preamble of the present convention.

"All the measures contemplated in this article shall be taken in the name, and on the account of the high contracting parties, without reference to the particular nationality of the forces employed to execute them." Treaty, Art. 1., Sec. 2 and 3.

drawn from the "execution" of the treaty, but not from the treaty—as the head burglar who forces the door may leave his agents to gather the plunder, while he retreats from the scene in order to plead an *alibi* hereafter, but still claiming his share of the spoils. If our prospects, as seen in Europe, should continue to brighten as they have for the past three months, we shall expect to see a still more manifest change in the tone of Earl Russell's letters. Already, instead of pushing directly for war, as in the Trent case, he contents himself with trying how far he can go in bullying and worrying without running into actual war. We may yet have to review his cordial compliments on the full re-establishment of the Union, with the most friendly assurances that this was what he always most wished to see, and what in fact he always confidently expected would be accomplished.

There are two dangers, lying back of those already considered, and therefore less obvious to the view, which we now only allude to, although each is well worthy of consideration in an article by itself. The first is the engrafting of a new principle upon the recognized laws of nations, in the right assumed by the Great Powers, of invading and occupying the territories of the feebler nations for the purpose of enforcing the payment of governmental bonds given to individual bankers, subjects or otherwise of the invading Powers. And this without reference to the equity of the case, as whether the bonds were given for a just consideration, or by a regularly constituted and responsible government. For the Jecker bonds, amounting to more than \$50,000,000, on which alone the French claim to interfere was grounded, were given by Zuloaga and Miramon, both usurpers, soon expelled by the people; they were sold at sums "varying from one-half of one per cent. to four or five per cent." of their nominal amount;* and the Jeckers were not French subjects at the time the bonds were given, but were naturalized during the subsequent negotiation, and for its purposes. If this is received as the law among nations, that the Great Powers may constitute themselves at once party, judge, and executioner, to enforce by arms the payment of bonds given to financiers, and without regard to the justice of the debt itself, then the smaller powers

* See Mr. Corwin's letter of June 29, 1861.

have lost their independent nationality, and subsist in form, not by any right in themselves, but solely by the permission of The Ring. And there never can be wanting a pretext for the coercion and subjugation of any one of them which may not square its conduct to the interest or the caprices of its superiors. And as the enslaver is always himself enslaved, it puts the Great Powers in their turn at the mercy and under the dictation of the lenders of money, who may demand their services at pleasure, in the humiliation or annihilation of a debtor state that dares to resist or offend the Money Power. In a word, it enthrones above all the governments of the civilized world, a supreme and dominant dictation, more cruel, heartless, and irresponsible than history ever recorded, controlling the industry and wealth of the world for its aggrandizement, and holding the forces of the world for its defense, and for the execution of its will; an *avatar* of "Associated Wealth," compared with which the "monster" national bank which Jackson slew, and even the confederated interest in slavery of a thousand millions now being annihilated, are but insect annoyances.

The other dangerous element in the case before us is the growing arrogance and strength of the Papal Power in connection with all the progressive developments of French ambition and conquest. It is curious to see how everything that France does or gains or aims at becomes subservient to the Papal Power, and turns to the disadvantage of religious liberty and of enlightened civilization. Beginning with the overthrow of the Roman Republic, and the still continued armed occupancy of Rome by a French army, as the only means of upholding the Pope in his throne as a temporal prince, we see in Cochin China, in Madagascar, in Turkey, in Spanish America, in Poland, and everywhere, that it is the support and favor of the Pope which constitutes Louis Napoleon's reliance in the last resort; and it is the extension and consolidation of the Papal Power which gives unity to all his aims, and the strength of a common interest to all his schemes. It is now clearly understood that the outbreak in Poland was but a plan for establishing in the center of Europe a Franco-Romish interest that should serve as a point of defense and aggression against Russia and the Greek Church. It is Po-

pery, struggling against the advance of freedom and civilization, that has for forty years kept the Spanish American States in turmoil, and kept them from consolidating their governments, or improving their conditions. In Venezuela, in Columbia, in Ecuador, everywhere, it is the Priests' Party against the body of the people; the people striving to recover the right of governing for themselves, and the Priests, aided by a few bigots, a few rich men, a few European Know-nothings, and a good many reckless and marauding brigands, trying to keep the power of the government in the hands of a class, and subject the many to the control of a few. This power has at length been happily put down, at least for the present, by the gallant and patriotic President Mosquera in Colombia. It has succumbed, at least temporarily, to a compromise in Venezuela; while, in the adjoining republic of Ecuador, it has apparently achieved an absolute triumph, in the treaty which was concluded in April last, by President Moreno with Cardinal Antonelli in the name of the Pope.* And one of the chief ends of the conquest of Mexico

* This treaty, which has been published in *El Nacional*, the official journal of Ecuador, contains the following articles, which serve to illustrate the Pope's ideas of religious liberty, where he has things in his own way:

"1. The Roman Catholic and Apostolic religion is the religion of the Republic of Ecuador. Consequently, the exercise of any other worship, or the existence of any society condemned by the Church, will not be permitted by the Republic.

"2. The education of the young in all public and private schools shall be entirely conformed to the doctrines of the [Roman] Catholic Religion. The teachers, the books, the instructions imparted, &c., &c. [the provisions are given in a very condensed form], shall be submitted to the decision of the bishops.

"3. Government will give its powerful patronage and its support to the bishops in their resistance to the evil designs of wicked persons, &c.

"4. All matrimonial causes, and all those which concern the faith, the sacraments, the public morals, &c., are placed under the sole jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical tribunals, and the civil magistrates shall be charged to carry them into execution. The priests shall confine themselves to consulting the lay judges, if they think proper to do so.

"6. The privileges of churches [the ancient right of asylum in consecrated buildings] shall be fully respected."

The Philadelphia *Catholic Herald and Visitor*, August 5th, exults:

"A most satisfactory Concordat has been concluded between the Holy See and the Republic of Ecuador, in South America. In that exclusively Catholic country, the public exercise of no other worship than the Catholic is to be allowed. The bishops are to have the control of the education of youth, and to propose three

by France, is announced to be the ascendancy of the Latin race, and the restoration of the Church of Rome to its ancient honor and power in the country. The confiscation already begun of the estates of all Mexicans guilty of the crime of supporting their own constitutional government, will prepare the way for the restoration of the estates of the Church, valued at a hundred millions of dollars, heretofore sequestered for the uses of the state.

In former days, the civilized world has been accustomed to rely for protection against any unwarrantable aggressions of Rome, upon the vigilance and strength of the two great Protestant Powers, Prussia and England. And it is a most unfortunate coincidence, that just at this time, when the Papal Power is so rapidly consolidating itself, and extending its influence over many countries, Prussia is well nigh powerless for any good purpose, by the insensate relapse of the present monarch into the wildest madness of absolutism; while the government of England is under the administration of a chief who seems to have become, practically, but a mere satrap of Louis Napoleon. Mr. Kinglake, in his remarkable volume on the Crimean War, before referred to, has described the process by which Great Britain was drawn, wholly beyond her intentions and against her interests, into that most bootless conflict. And there is no reason to expect that the same fallacious *entente cordiale* will not be made available to draw her onward, *volens volens*, into whatever ulterior national embroilments the conquest of Mexico may lead to, in the interest of Popery and Absolutism.

In these frank and honest animadversions on the conduct of our affairs, we would not be understood as affirming that these evils, felt and feared, might have been prevented by a more open, and firm, and earnest maintenance of our point of honor before Europe; or that the conspiracy of crowned heads against republican liberty could have been broken up in the year 1861, as it was in 1823, by the mere utterance of the magic words of the

candidates for the vacant episcopal sees to the selection of the President and of the Pope. No *Ezequatur*, no Piedmontism, no Gallicanism, no shortcomings. The Hispano-American population, in the State of Ecuador, mean to be *truly and generously Catholic!*"

Monroe Doctrine. Things are not as they were forty years ago in many particulars, as we have too much reason to know. But we are quite confident that, if there had been in 1861 a firm and fearless reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine, in its plain meaning, as a long established principle from which the United States could never depart under any circumstances, and had our government put to each of the governments concerned in the coalition against Mexico, a direct and categorical question as to the objects of the invasion and the methods proposed for their attainment, with the intimation that we expected a frank and explicit answer, our title to which had been recognized in years long gone by—it might not have defeated the plot, but it might have caused a hitch in the progress of the negotiations; and it would, at any rate, have placed us right on the record before Europe whenever the crisis should come, as come it must. And it would have given proof to the world of our continued confidence in the stability of our institutions, and in the inherent strength of our government to maintain itself, which might have helped to change the course of public opinion on that continent among all that are capable of forming an intelligent judgment as to political causes and effects. A single sentence of plain Saxon English, at that juncture, would have done more for us, than whole quires of flashy oratory and glowing prophecies always made ridiculous by events. The world would have seen by such a declaration in advance of the victories of our arms, that the spirit of the republic was wholly unbroken, and that we exacted from other nations the same respect and deference, which they were ready enough to pay us in the glorious days of President Monroe. They would have felt that the determination to ask nothing but what is right, and to submit to nothing that is wrong, is just as indomitable under President Lincoln as it was under General Jackson. A nation that is always sensitive to its point of honor, is always respected among nations, if it has any force whatever. And we might have been spared many a supercilious affront from Palmerston, and many an insolent rebuke from Russell, and many an impertinent offer of interference from Louis Napoleon, if, at the lowest point of our disasters, we had taken that occasion to re-assert our highest self-respect as the leading republic of

the New World, and the ready representative of the Political System of America, with which European politics had no business to interfere.*

* But the Monroe Doctrine is not dead. It will not die, for truth never dies, and the Monroe Doctrine is an axiomatic truth in political science. It is as true now as it was when Washington issued his Farewell Address, that "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns." It is as true now as it was when Mr. Monroe issued his Declaration, that "any attempt on the part of European powers to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere," IS "dangerous to our peace and safety." And we of this day have been brought at length by the cogent force of events, to see as clearly as that golden administration saw, that "any interposition" with any of the American nations, "by any European power," for the purpose of "controlling their destiny," IS "the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." Those who have doubted, now see it plainly. The efforts for forty years, of selfish partisans, of timid statesmen, of political sciolists, of venal scribblers, or of covert reactionaries, to make it out that the Monroe Doctrine was a *brutum fulmen*, which struck no blow and made no mark, and then vanished into thin air, are all blown to the winds. The clouds which temporarily shrouded it from general view, have been rolled away by the winds from Mexico and South America, and the Doctrine shines forth as the political cynosure by which we are to steer our national course through this sea of difficulties, until the Imperial Republic shall resume her proper honors, and take the foremost place among the nations, as a light to oppressed millions, and the political regenerator of the world.

What is next to be done, is not for us to prescribe. By what

* In the maintenance of a professed neutrality between Mexico our friend, and France our enemy, we seem to have followed the American rule where it went against Mexico, and the European rule where it favored France—prohibiting the export of arms, which the former was destitute of, and allowing that of mules to the latter.

steps or through what struggles on our part the Monroe Doctrine is to be restored to its ancient respect in the counsels of European dynasties, will depend more upon the wishes of those Powers than on our own. The United States have long ago reached that condition of conscious strength anticipated by Washington, when under any European intrusion "we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by our justice, shall counsel."* Should the European Powers receive the lessons of our recent successes, and speedily withdraw their criminal aggressions on a neighboring republic, thus paying their old homage to the Monroe Doctrine, that is well. Should they make open war upon us, we shall meet them as best we may, notwithstanding our embarrassments with the rebellion. Such a country as this, inhabited by such a people, and blessed with such institutions and such a history, is worth a struggle of a hundred years against the world in arms, before we allow the Political System of Europe to be extended over us by all the military force that can be brought against us. Should they merely continue their intrusions and impertinencies, we can afford to consult our own convenience, and choose our own time for appealing to the last resort of injured nations for redress of the wrong.

And if the European Powers should see fit to press the matter to its ultimate issue, we shall not shrink from our proper responsibility, as a free people and the friends of free institutions. And the Powers may be sure that we shall not stand wholly on the defensive. We will say no word and do no act implying an admission that the Political System of America is less honorable than that of Europe, or less true, or less beneficent, or less worthy of heroic sacrifices in its cause, or less deserving of universal adoption. The question will then lie between the European System for America, and the American System for Europe. If, by their machinations or aggressions, we are once involved in their conflicts against our will, there will be no more peace for us or for them, until the American ideas of national independence and responsibility have been spread over the countries of the Old World, and the doctrines of national interference and

*Farewell Address.

the Balance of Power have been cast among the rubbish with the systems of absolutism and popular ignorance which they were devised to support. And let God give the victory to the right!

ADDITIONAL NOTE.

Since this article was written, a letter has appeared from Mr. Everett, the object of which is to show that the English government originated the Monroe Doctrine, and urged its adoption, quoting in proof the account of Mr. Canning's negotiations with Mr. Rush, as narrated by the latter. It is true that the British government and nation welcomed the announcement by Mr. Monroe, as a reasonable help, and is therefore justly bound by its own consistency not to complain of our continued adherence to the same principle. But a careful perusal of the whole of Mr. Rush's account will show a material difference between what Mr. Canning asked and what Mr. Monroe did. Mr. Canning's object was a British advantage—to bring in the United States as an auxiliary to British negotiations. What Mr. Monroe did was for American honor, placing the United States on the high vantage ground of national equality, and of independent impartiality towards all nations. It is the difference between patronage and manly equality, between a measure and a principle, between a temporary expedient in aid of England, and a system of policy for the paramount welfare of the American Continent. Yet Mr. Canning's representations are well worthy of being deeply pondered by both continents:

Mr. Rush having stated that it had been the traditional rule of the Government of the United States not to interfere with European politics, Mr. Canning replied:

"However just such a policy might have been formerly, or might continue to be as a general policy, he apprehended that powerful and controlling circumstances made it inapplicable upon the present occasion. The question was a new and complicated one in modern affairs. It was also full as much American as European, *to say no more*. It concerned the United States under aspects and interests as immediate and commanding as it did or could any of the States of Europe. They were the first Power established on that Continent, and confessedly the leading Power. They were connected with Spanish America by their position, as with Europe by their relations; and they also stood connected with these new States by political relations. *Was it possible that they could see with indifference their fate decided upon by Europe?* Could Europe expect this indifference? Had not a new epoch arrived in the relative position of the United States toward Europe which Europe must acknowledge? *Were the great political and commercial interests which hung upon the destinies of the new Continent to be canvassed and adjusted in this hemisphere, without the co-operation or even knowledge of the United States?* Were they to be canvassed and adjusted, he would even add, without some proper understanding between the United States and Great Britain, as the two chief commercial and maritime States of both worlds? He hoped not, he would wish to persuade himself not."



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